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Abstract. Auction theories are believed to provide a better selling opportunity for the resources
to be allocated. Various organizations have taken measures to increase trust among participants
towards  their auction system, but trust alone cannot  ensure a high level of participation. We
propose a new type of auction system which takes advantage of lucky draw and gambling ad-
dictions to increase the engagement level of candidates in an auction. Our system makes use of
security features present in existing auction systems for ensuring fairness and maintaining trust
among participants.
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1 Introduction
Auction systems are used for allowing authorities to fairly allocate resources among
participants based on some defined set of rules. It is a common belief that auction sys-
tem helps in allowing seller to gain more profit as it allows groups to compete with
each other to obtain a certain resource. Different types of auction systems are devel-
oped to maintain the trust of participants in auction systems with the hope of obtain-
ing better selling price for the resource. While in other systems such as gambling, a
large number of people lose money but still most of the people got addicted to it and
keep playing. Similarly, in a lottery-based system, people know that their chance of
winning is the same as everyone else but they keep believing that they might win and
continue buying lottery tickets. Despite the fact that in gambling and lottery-based
systems the majority of the people are destined to losses money without getting any
reward, still the participation number is very high with respect to auctions where if
someone is allocated the resource than only, they have to pay their bidding amount
In this paper, we explored more on the integration of an auction system with gam-
bling, and lucky-draw based addictions to design a hybrid type of auction system.
This hybrid system contains addictive nature present in lucky draw and gambling sys-
tems. We have also studied the effects of our proposed auction systems on the en-
gagement of participants and on the selling price of the auctioned resources
22 Related Works
Y.H. Lee et al. [1] studied the effect of prospect imageability and mental imagery on
consumer behavior. H Wardle et al. [2] analyzed the effect of gambling machines on
social and economic condition of its locality. A Blaszczynski et al. [3] described gen-
eral methods which can be used to reduce the negative impact of gambling and fo-
cuses on responsible form of gambling. V Ariyabuddhiphongs et al. [4] explained var-
ious forms of gambling and focused on reason which motivates people to buy lottery
and against a popular belief he further concluded that big wins tends to improve win-
ner’s life. Y Mu et al. [5] proposed an internet-based bidding system for sealed-bid
auctions fulfilling necessary security requirements without using multiple server sys-
tems.  CY Olivola et al. [6] used incentive compatible mechanism to compare time vs
money preference behavior. WJ Jung et al. [7] focused on studying customer engage-
ment using contest based social media marketing. R Zhang et al. [8] proposed a quan-
tum system ensuring security in sealed-bid auction. G E Kersten et al. [9] performed a
comparative study on auctions and negotiations and then suggested that social effect
become much dominant over competitive nature when transparency is provided. AK
Naik et al. [10] suggested that auctioneer also plays important role in bidding and
some benefits should be given to auctioneers to keep their motivation high which will
lead to higher final bidding prices.
3 Proposed auction system
Addictive auction system consists of two fundamental concepts of catalysts and recip-
ients. The catalysts are the participants who provides some amount of money to the
recipients (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Catalyst pays some amount to the recipient.
In our method, there is a dynamic list containing P id and its association with candi-
dates and their bidding amount. Each Pid contains details about the amount bid at an
instance, along with the bidder details. This dynamic list keeps on updating with ev-
ery new bidding during the auctioning. Each Pid gets updated with every new bidding
3amount introduced by any participant during the auctioning. The Pid of each individual
is updated using a simple formula.
Pid = T - ni
Here, T represents the total number of biddings that took place up to that instant, and
ni represents the instances at which each person had bid in the auction. To better un-
derstand the concept of Pid , we have provided a sample demonstration.
Table 1. Sample demonstration using Catalyst at id = 3 and recipient at id = 0
Instance Pid and associated details Catalyst Recipient
0
P0: {Person 1, 100}
Null Person 1
1
P0: {Person 2, 150}, P1: {Person 1, 100}
Null Person 2
2
P0: {Person 3, 200}, P1: {Person 2, 150}, 
P2: {Person 1, 100}
Person 1 Person 3
3
P0: {Person 1, 250}, P1: {Person 3, 200}, 
P2: {Person 2, 150}, P3: {Person 1, 100}
Person 1 Person 1
4
P0: {Person 3: 400}
P1: {Person 1, 250}, P2: {Person 3, 200}, 
P3: {Person 2, 150}, P4: {Person 1, 100}
Person 2 Person 3
Our system also has a parameter α with a range of (0,1]. This parameter plays a major
role in deciding the amount to be paid to the recipient.  Before the beginning of the
auction, values of α and index of Catalyst (i.e. Pc) are already known to all the partici-
pants.   Catalyst  and  recipients  are  assigned  such  that  the  id  of  catalyst  is  always
greater than that of the recipient. The person with Pid of a catalyst will provide alpha
times the amount associated with its id to the recipient. Each new bidding increases
the amount that participant with catalyst id have to pay to the recipient. 
Since the probability of one becoming a catalyst in total of n+1 participant is 1/
(n+1) which is much lower than the possibility of one losing a one-winner based gam-
bling i.e. n/(n+1).  As the auction progresses,  our system motivates more people to
take advantage of becoming a recipient. While with each increasing bidding it moti-
vates participants with the catalyst Pid to bid higher and move away from the catalyst
position.
We have provided two varieties of addictive auction systems based on the relation-
ships present among the catalysts and recipients and source code for both these vari-
ants are available at our github repository [11].
43.1 When recipient is the highest bidder
In this type of addictive auction, the recipient is the highest bidder. This type of sys-
tem motivates the participants to make the highest bidding and take advantage of re-
ceiving some amount from the catalyst as well as obtain the auctioned resource (Fig.
2).
Fig. 2. When highest bidder is assigned as the recipient.
3.2 When recipient is in between the highest bidder and the catalyst
In this arrangement the highest bidder is not the recipient, which makes this arrange -
ment a pure hybrid of a traditional auction system and lucky-draw based gambling
system (Fig. 3).  This type of arrangement motivates the candidates to participate in
the auction. This motivation leads to an increase in the frequency of bidding, and in
turn helps in increasing the final bidding amount.
5Fig. 3. When the recipient is in between the highest bidder and the catalyst.
Due to this hybrid nature of our proposed system, it can also be named as “collabora-
tive auction” as the addictive nature of gambling helps the candidates to participate at
a much higher level.
4 Working Demonstration
We conducted an auctioning experiment to analyze the effects of both variants of our
proposed auctioning system. In this experiment we studied the differences in the final
bidding amount, engagement of participants, and in the total time taken to reach the
final bidding among general auctioning and our addictive auctioning system.
6Table 1. Experiment related details
S.no Symbol/Variable name Description
1  Total Participants 50
2  Parameter α 0.1
3 Catalyst id (in 4.2) 4
4 Catalyst id (in 4.3) 4
5 Recipient id (in 4.3) 2
4.1 When a highest-bidder wins, type traditional auction system is used
In this case, auctioning is performed using traditional rule of highest-bidder gets the
auctioned resource. After repeated experimentation with different groups of partici-
pants an average bidding trend in obtained (Fig. 4)
Fig. 4. Visual analysis of bidding data.
4.2 Addictive auction, when recipient is the highest bidder
In this case, bidding is performed using the recipient is the highest bidder variant of
proposed addictive auction system. The average bidding trends obtained in this vari-
ant shows much higher bidding amounts, suggesting that the system motivated candi-
dates to bid higher and higher as the highest bidder will also be having benefit of be -
ing the recipient (Fig. 5).
7Fig. 5. Visual analysis of bidding data.
4.3 Addictive auction, recipient is between highest bidder and catalyst
In this case, bidding is performed using the recipient in between highest bidder and
catalyst  variant  of proposed addictive auction system. After  analyzing the average
bidding trends, It suggests that although the system motivated candidates to bid higher
but after some point the rapid increase in the bidding price slows down a little, as
some participants became interested in obtaining recipient Pid and taking free money
at home (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. Visual analysis of bidding data.
84.4 Overall Comparative analysis
A comparative analysis on the collected auction data is performed to figure out the
performances of traditional highest-bidder wins and variants of addictive auction sys-
tems
Fig. 7. Visual analysis of bidding data.
After analysis (Fig. 7), it became clear that both variants of proposed addictive auc-
tions took less time to achieve the final bidding amount of traditional highest-bidder
wins. This happened because of the addictive nature of gambling (i.e. catalyst and re-
cipient) kept candidates more engaged and motivated to take part in the auction.
Although, among both the variants of addictive auctions when highest-bidder was
kept the recipient had reached higher final bidding amount than the other. This might
have happened because in the longer run, some participants became more interested in
becoming the recipient and not the highest-bidder. This situation could be further re-
solved by kept on increasing the minimum increment to amount for doing bidding as
the auction goes forward. 
5 Conclusion
Our proposed auction systems have shown potential of increasing the overall partici-
pation in auctions leading to increase in the final bidding amount. The combined ef-
fect of addictive nature of gambling system to an auction system help in increasing
the participation of candidates. It also makes auctions more attention gathering and in
turn reducing the illegal gambling activities which in turn leads to better law and or-
der establishment.
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